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Abstract 
This paper argues against the proposal to draw from current research into a physical theory of 
quantum gravity the ontological conclusion that spacetime or spatiotemporal relations are not 
fundamental. As things stand, the status of this proposal is like the one of all the other claims 
about radical changes in ontology that were made during the development of quantum 
mechanics and quantum field theory. However, none of these claims held up to scrutiny as a 
consequence of the physics once the theory was established and a serious discussion about its 
ontology had begun. Furthermore, the paper argues that if spacetime is to be recovered through a 
functionalist procedure in a theory that admits no fundamental spacetime, standard functionalism 
cannot serve as a model: all the known functional definitions are definitions in terms of a causal 
role for the motion of physical objects and hence presuppose spatiotemporal relations. 
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1. The functionalization of spacetime 
It is widely alleged that when it comes to the physics of quantum gravity, spacetime turns out 
to be no longer fundamental (see e.g. Rovelli 2004, ch. 10, Kiefer 2007, ch. 5, Oriti 2014, 
Crowther 2016, Wüthrich 2017). The claim is not only that there is no fundamental spacetime 
substance, but also that spatiotemporal relations are not fundamental. Thus, the claim is not 
that, as there is a shift from Euclidean to Riemannian geometry in the transition from 
Newtonian gravitation to Einstein’s general theory of relativity, so there may be another such 
shift in geometry in the transition to a quantum theory of gravity. The claim is much more 
radical, namely that after that transition, there will be nothing left in fundamental physics that 
is like the spacetime or the spatiotemporal relations with which we are familiar. Thus, this 
claim does not concern string theory and its unification project: on string theory, there is a 
fundamental spacetime that even serves as background space. It has more dimensions than 
four, but, still, string theory is distinct from positions that reject the fundamentality of 
spacetime. Prominent examples of approaches to a physical theory of quantum gravity on the 
basis of which this radical conclusion is drawn are loop quantum gravity and causal set 
theory. 
This paper is an argument against this conclusion. In nuce, the argument to be developed in 
the following two sections is that this claim is on a par with all the other claims about radical 
changes in ontology that have been made during the development of quantum mechanics and 
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quantum field theory. None of these claims held up to scrutiny as a consequence of the 
physics once the theory was established and a serious discussion about its ontology had 
begun. Furthermore, the argument of this paper is that as things stand, there is no other 
worked out functionalism than the one in terms of causal or functional roles for the motion of 
spatiotemporally related objects. This functionalism thus presupposes spacetime (at least in 
the guise of fundamental spatiotemporal relations). It can hence not serve as a model for a 
research programme whose aim is to show how spacetime and spatiotemporally related 
objects enter into a theory that does not admit a fundamental spacetime. 
The claim that there are no fundamental spatiotemporal relations could be true. The 
argument of this paper is not about an alleged empirical incoherence of physical theories that 
do not admit fundamental spatiotemporal relations. It is difficult to sustain any a priori claims 
about empirical incoherence in a science based or naturalized metaphysics. The most 
promising strategy to show how a theory that does not admit fundamental spatiotemporal 
relations can be true is functionalism about spacetime (see in particular Lam and Wüthrich 
2018). The functionalism at issue here goes beyond the functionalism about spacetime that 
Knox advocates in her recently published paper (2018). The functionalism defended in this 
paper is a functionalism about geometry only. According to Knox (2018, p. 5), “… spacetime 
is whatever serves to define a structure of inertial frames, where inertial frames are those in 
whose coordinates the laws governing interactions take a simple form (…), and with respect 
to which free bodies move with constant velocity”. Inertial frames obviously presuppose 
objects that move and that hence are spatiotemporally related. This functionalism concerns 
only the geometry, which, according to this view, enters into a physical theory through its 
causal or functional role for the motion of objects. It thus is akin to standard functionalism. 
Consider functionalism in the special sciences. For instance, there is no fundamental water 
stuff in the world. Nevertheless, there is water in the world, namely things that fulfil the 
functional role of appearing odourless, colourless, being thirst-quenching through the change 
in the motion of the parts of our bodies that they bring about, and these are configurations of 
H2O molecules (for the sake of the example, let us leave aside here the arguments according 
to which “water” is a rigid designator). By the same token, there is no élan vital; but there are 
living organisms in the world. The functional role that defines what it is to be alive in terms of 
characteristic motions such as reproduction and adaptation to the environment is realized by 
certain configurations of molecules. Furthermore, there arguably are no sui generis minds; but 
there are mental states defined by certain functional roles for the behaviour and thus the 
bodily motions of persons. These roles are fulfilled by certain configurations of neurons. In 
all these cases, something goes – the primitive water stuff (think of the four elements earth, 
water, air, fire), the primitive life, the primitive mind (or consciousness). But water, life, the 
mind remains, since it is functionalized. What the functional definition in terms of a causal 
role for the motion of bodies captures arguably is all there is to water, life, the mind. 
There is a very good motivation for pursuing such a functionalist project. Consider how 
Jackson (1994, p. 25) describes the task of metaphysics: 
Metaphysicians seek a comprehensive account of some subject matter – the mind, the semantic, 
or, most ambitiously, everything – in terms of a limited number of more or less basic notions. … 
But if metaphysics seeks comprehension in terms of limited ingredients, it is continually going 
to be faced with the problem of location. Because the ingredients are limited, some putative 
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features of the world are not going to appear explicitly in the story. The question then will be 
whether they, nevertheless, figure implicitly in the story. 
Functionalism is the answer to that question: water, life, minds, etc. do not appear explicitly 
in the story of basic physical objects and laws for their motion. But they figure implicitly in 
that story: some configurations of basic physical objects moving in a particular way are 
water, others are living beings, and yet others are minds because they fulfil the functional 
roles that characterize water, life, or minds in terms of the behaviour and thus the motion of 
bodies. These configurations may be configurations of point particles, field configurations or 
configurations of events, whatever may come out as the basic, spatiotemporally related 
physical objects according to classical mechanics, the standard model of elementary particle 
physics or general relativity theory. 
Functionalism is a reductionist programme in the following sense: the tokens of water, 
living beings, minds, etc. that exist in the universe are identified with certain configurations of 
in the last resort basic physical objects and their characteristic motions. If a complete physical 
description of the configurations of basic physical objects in the universe and their motions 
were given together with the functional definitions, that description would entail which of 
these configurations are water, which ones are living beings, which ones are minds, etc. 
(although one may have reservations about Jackson’s (1994) claim that this is a matter of a 
priori entailment). Hence, there is no question here of emergence in the sense of something 
new being added to the ontology. It is true that only some configurations of basic physical 
objects are water, living beings, or minds. These configurations exist only at particular times 
and only in certain regions of the universe. Nonetheless, since the configurations in question 
are water, living beings, or minds, no additional ontological commitments that go beyond the 
commitments to basic physical objects, their configurations and motions are called for. In 
brief, functionalism allows us to locate features of the world in an ontology that is conceived 
only in terms of a few basic and general notions of a fundamental physical theory of the 
universe. 
This motivation for functionalism may apply to spacetime as well. If spacetime, including 
spatiotemporal relations, is not fundamental, it better enters the ontology through 
functionalization, since there is no question of eliminating it. In that way, it can be shown 
how it is located in something that is not spatiotemporal. The term “location” is used by 
Jackson (1994) in the quotation above in a metaphorical sense. It is not necessarily tied to 
spatiotemporal location – although in the standard examples of functionalism, there is 
location in the literal sense. 
There is no a priori reason that obliges us to admit spacetime – or spatiotemporal relations 
– to the ontology being defined in terms of the fundamental and general notions. Spacetime 
may be open to functionalization as well. Something about spacetime then has to go, namely 
the idea that it is a substance, or that at least the network of spatiotemporal relations is a 
network of irreducible relations. Nonetheless, it may be possible to functionalize the essential 
features of spacetime that are relevant for the account of what we know about spacetime and 
spatiotemporally related objects. In this case, then, say, some particular spin networks (if loop 
gravity turns out to be the correct theory), or some particular causal sets (if causal set theory 
turns out to be the correct theory), are relativistic spacetimes in the sense that they fulfil the 
functional role that relativistic spacetime plays in the accomplished scientific image of the 
world that includes quantum gravity. 
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However, one has to be clear about the task that this project faces: by contrast to the well 
understood standard examples of the functionalization of something, what has to be provided 
in this case is a functional definition of something in terms of a functional role that is not a 
role which is defined in terms of the motion of spatiotemporal objects, but a functional role 
for the evolution of, for instance, spin networks or causal sets. To put it in other words, in the 
terms of Lewis (1970, 1972), some other original or old (that is, basic) vocabulary has in this 
case to be provided that does not rely on the familiar old vocabulary of spatiotemporal 
relations between physical objects (or spatial relations and their change) and with respect to 
which functional roles that objects standing in these relations fulfil are defined. In particular, 
in this case, we need another world-making relation than the spatial or spatiotemporal one. As 
things stand, spatial or spatiotemporal relations are world-making because all and only those 
objects that are spatially or spatiotemporally related belong to the same world; objects that are 
not thus related belong to different possible worlds (cf. Lewis 1986, ch. 1.6). 
Again, functionalizing spacetime is a reductionist project in the mentioned sense. Although 
the issue is the emergence of spacetime from something that is fundamentally not 
spatiotemporal, this is not an emergence as opposed to reduction: some spin networks, or 
some causal sets, then are relativistic spacetimes. If the complete description of the spin 
networks or causal sets of the universe were given, that description would entail which spin 
networks, or causal sets, are relativistic spacetimes. It is only that the concepts characterizing 
relativistic spacetimes do not figure in the description of the spin networks or causal sets and 
that only some spin networks or causal sets are spacetimes. But this is just what applies to 
functionalism in general as a solution to the problem of location. Location is a reductionist 
affair: identity as far as ontology is concerned, and entailment as regards epistemology. There 
is nothing a priori incoherent with such a functionalist project, merely because this time it 
tackles spacetime, instead of water, life, or the mind. The issue is whether there is, as things 
stand in physics, any cogent reason to believe that such a project has or is likely to have the 
same status that it enjoys in chemistry, biology or psychology. Taking into account the 
standard for ontology in the established areas of quantum physics (quantum mechanics and 
quantum field theory) suggests that there is no such reason. 
2. The case of quantum mechanics 
Consider non-relativistic quantum mechanics. The algebra of operators in a Hilbert space is 
not Boolean. Does it follow from this that classical logic no longer is appropriate for the 
description of the world? The Heisenberg uncertainty relations exclude that it is possible to 
measure both the position and the momentum of a quantum system with arbitrary precision at 
the same time. Does it follow from this that quantum systems do not have definite positions 
and that they do not move on continuous trajectories? It is in general only possible to make 
statistical predictions of measurement outcome distributions, but not deterministic predictions 
of single measurement outcomes. Does it follow from this that the laws to which quantum 
systems are subject are not deterministic and that probabilities in quantum mechanics have a 
more fundamental status than in classical statistical mechanics (where they are derived from 
the deterministic laws of classical mechanics plus an appropriate probability measure)? 
No one who is familiar with the debate about the ontology of quantum mechanics would 
answer these questions in the affirmative. The reason is not that, at the end of the day, it may 
not be established that quantum mechanics requires amending classical logic, that quantum 
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systems usually do not have definite positions and that they do not move on continuous 
trajectories and that probabilities are irreducible in quantum mechanics. The point at issue is 
that these claims do not follow from the physics of quantum mechanics per se. If one is to 
make a case for these claims, extensive philosophical argument is required. The reason for 
this is threefold:  
1) Generally speaking, there is no possibility to read ontological conclusions off from the 
mathematical structures that physical theories employ. Any reasoning that leads to 
ontological conclusions requires ontological premises. 
2) The above mentioned claims, notably the second one, run into the measurement problem 
(see Maudlin 1995 for the by now standard formulation of this problem): if quantum 
systems do in general not have definite positions, how does it come about that they are 
found in definite positions when measured? How do they get from the preparation at a 
determinate position to the measurement at a determinate position? Note that all 
measurement records in physics are records of positions of discrete objects, as Bell (2004, 
p. 166) among others pointed out. 
3) There are formulations of quantum mechanics in which none of the three mentioned 
claims is true. These formulations are coherent, they propose a solution to the 
measurement problem, and they yield the correct statistical predictions. Thus, any attempt 
to establish one of the above mentioned claims has to give reasons why it is a better 
candidate for the truth about the world than these formulations. 
In sum, the standard for ontology in quantum mechanics is the solution to the measurement 
problem (cf. Albert 1992). Any suggestions for ontological consequences from quantum 
mechanics have to spell out how they come to terms with this problem. 
Consider Bohmian mechanics as one formulation of quantum mechanics in which none of 
the three mentioned claims comes out true as a consequence of the way in which this theory 
solves the measurement problem. This theory will prove to be particularly instructive when 
we return to the issue of spacetime in quantum gravity. On the way in which Dürr, Goldstein 
and Zanghì (2013) set up Bohmian mechanics, the ontology (or primitive ontology, as they 
call it) is point particles that always have a position and that move on continuous trajectories 
in physical space. This gives us an account of the individual physical processes that happen in 
nature that provides for measurement outcomes and that avoids the well known paradoxes 
such as Schrödinger’s cat. 
The particle trajectories – that is, the velocities of the particles at any time given their 
positions at that time – are fixed by a law of motion, the so called guiding equation, by means 
of the wave function. The wave function, in turn, develops according to the Schrödinger 
equation. These laws are joined with a probability measure, defining what is known as 
quantum equilibrium, from which then follows Born’s rule for the predictions of 
measurement outcome statistics on ensembles of systems in the universe that are prepared in 
the same manner. The operators or observables of quantum mechanics (including spin) then 
are construed as a means to make statistical predictions about how the particles move in 
certain experimental contexts (see Lazarovici et al. 2018). Hence, they are not properties of 
anything. The only properties of the particles are their position and change of position 
(motion). 
If position and its change is the only primitive property of the particles, then Bohmian 
mechanics is committed to functionalism already for variables such as mass and charge. They 
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have to be located in an ontology that admits only naked particles and their motion as 
primitive. They can thus be located by introducing them in terms of a functional role for the 
motion of the particles. Such a view can arguably already be applied to mass in Newtonian 
mechanics, as for instance Mach (1919, p. 241) pointed out in his remark “The true definition 
of mass can be deduced only from the dynamical relations of bodies”. To put it in a nutshell, 
some particles are electrons because they move electronwise. What it means to move 
electronwise is captured in terms of the functional role for particle motion that defines the 
parameter of charge. The particles are not in an intrinsic or primitive way electrons (see 
Dickson 2000 and Esfeld et al. 2017 as well as the identity based version of Bohmian 
mechanics set out in Goldstein et al. 2005a, 2005b). Against this background, Bohmian 
mechanics can then buy into the standard functionalism for the special sciences with the 
functional definitions being in the last resort ones in terms of functional roles for particle 
motion. 
The probabilities in Bohmian quantum mechanics have the same status as the probabilities 
in classical statistical mechanics: they follow from a deterministic law via an appropriate 
probability measure. In general, the ontology in the sense of primitive ontology of Bohmian 
mechanics is the same as the one of classical mechanics: point particles moving on 
continuous trajectories that are determined by a deterministic law. The only difference is on 
the level of the law: the trajectories are determined by the wave function. The wave function 
is defined on configuration space (for N particles, the configuration space has 3N dimensions 
so that each point of configuration space represents a possible configuration of N particles in 
three-dimensional physical space). This has the consequence that the evolution of the wave 
function in configuration space represents the motion of the particles in physical space as 
being correlated independently of the spatial distance among these particles. This non-locality 
is necessary in Bohm’s quantum theory in order to accommodate Bell’s theorem and the 
subsequent experiments (see Bell 2004, in particular chs. 2 and 7). Any quantum theory that 
is about objects in physical space has to admit a non-locality in the sense of correlated 
behaviour of these objects independently of their spatial or spatiotemporal distance in 
physical space. 
Consequently, on Bohmian mechanics, there never are superpositions of anything in 
physical space. There only is correlated particle motion, with these correlations being 
determined by the entanglement of the wave function. Hence, there is no paradox of how 
quantum objects can show up at precise locations when measured, although they do in general 
not have positions in space. There are even arguments developed in the literature to the effect 
that Bohmian mechanics provides the best solution to the measurement problem in 
comparison to rival accounts (see e.g. Bricmont 2016, chs. 5-6, and Esfeld 2014). 
However, Bohmian mechanics is in general not useful as a calculatory device for working 
physicists. There often is no point in calculating Bohmian particle trajectories. The reason is 
the high sensitivity of quantum systems to slight variations in the initial conditions together 
with the fact that the initial conditions cannot be fixed with arbitrary precision. The rationale 
of Bohmian mechanics is to solve the measurement problem – in other words, to provide a 
full and coherent answer to the question of what nature is like if quantum mechanics is true. 
Such a theory usually comes later than the formalism for working physicists (after a first 
attempt by de Broglie 1928, the theory had been developed for many particles by Bohm 
1952). 
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Generally speaking, the worked out solutions to the measurement problem fall into two 
camps: on the one hand, there is the primitive ontology answer in terms of localized objects in 
three-dimensional space or four-dimensional spacetime, known as “local beables” (that 
neologism goes back to Bell 2004, ch. 7). The wave function provides for the dynamics of 
these objects, but it is not a physical object in addition to the “local beables”. Bohmian 
mechanics is the most prominent example of this answer. 
On the other hand, there is the wave function monism answer that regards the quantum 
wave function as the only physical object and that seeks to account for the experimental 
evidence on this basis. This idea goes back to Everett (1957). One version of this camp is the 
configuration space realism developed notably by Albert (1996, 2015, chs. 6-7). This version 
is relevant for present purposes, because it does not regard ordinary spacetime or ordinary 
spatiotemporal relations as fundamental. It sets out to give a functional account of ordinary 
spatiotemporal objects on the basis of what it admits as primitive. It thereby provides the up 
to now only example of a worked out ontology for an existing physical theory that does not 
endorse spacetime as fundamental and that employs functionalism to achieve empirical 
adequacy (that link is also discussed in Lam and Wüthrich 2018, pp. 41-42). 
According to this stance, the ontology is the universal wave function, which is a field on a 
very high dimensional space that is usually known as the configuration space of the universe. 
Strictly speaking, however, on this view, this is not a configuration space, since there are no 
configurations of anything that its points represent. This space is fundamental. Configuration 
space is the physical space. There is a matter field on this space in the guise of the universal 
wave function. On this view, none of the three claims mentioned at the beginning of this 
section and suggested by a superficial consideration of quantum mechanics is true either 
(although both this view as well as the primitive ontology view can accommodate a dynamics 
of wave function collapse, which is probabilistic instead of deterministic; however, this 
dynamics then is not based on the statistical predictions of measurement outcomes, but is 
motivated by a solution to the measurement problem in terms of wave function collapse and 
in fact yields statistical predictions that deviate in some cases from the ones obtained by 
textbook quantum mechanics). 
The procedure to account for ordinary objects and the experimental evidence on this basis 
then is exactly the one described as the motivation for functionalism in the first section above: 
one gives a functional definition of ordinary objects including the experimental evidence and 
locates something that fulfils that functional definition in the evolution of the universal wave 
function on configuration space. That is to say: some degrees of freedom in the wave function 
field in some regions of configuration space are tigers, cats, measurement records in 
laboratories, etc., functionally defined. The claim thus is that a physical realization of these 
functionally defined things in our universe does not require composition by spatiotemporally 
related objects (“spatiotemporally related” understood in the ordinary sense of a low-
dimensional space). 
So it seems that we have two rival accounts of the experimental results of quantum 
mechanics that both rely on functionalism. Both endorse functionalism with respect to the 
special sciences and common sense. Both postulate theoretical entities as the realizers of those 
functional roles in the universe – configurations of point particles, a wave function field on 
configuration space. None of these is or will ever be observable. However, there is an 
important difference between these two functionalist projects. For any functionalist project to 
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succeed, the definition of the features that come up for functionalization cannot just be a 
definition in terms of some functional role or other, but it has to be a role for – and thus 
exercized by – the behaviour of those entities that make up the fundamental ontology. 
Otherwise, the project to show how these features are located in the fundamental ontology 
and therefore figure implicitly in the story told in the terms of the fundamental ontology 
would be a non-starter. It would then not be possible to figure out the realizers of these 
functional roles. 
To appreciate this crucial point, consider again functionalism in the philosophy of mind. 
This position is the successor of behaviourism (cf. Lewis 1966). The definition of mental 
states in terms of a causal or functional role includes causal relations to other mental states (in 
contrast to behaviourism); but in the end, it has to be a definition of mental states in terms of 
their effects on bodily motions, which finally are motions of the molecules that compose the 
body and which have a molecular cause in the brain. Otherwise, the project to locate mental 
states in the scientific image of the world would be doomed from the start (cf. Lewis 1972). 
Consider for illustration the contrast between what is known as a right wing Sellarsian 
functionalism of mental states in terms of their biological function, which in the end is a 
functional role for molecular motion (e.g. Millikan 1993), versus what is known as a left wing 
Sellarsian functionalism of mental states in terms of sui generis normative roles, that is, roles 
that stay within the normative space of reasons (e.g. Brandom 1994) (both these versions of 
functionalism go back to Sellars 1956). In the former case, the functional roles are defined in 
terms of effects on the motion of three-dimensional physical objects. Consequently, the 
mental states are in the last resort located in the particle configuration of the universe – more 
precisely, particle configurations in the brain. The latter also is a case of functionalism. 
However, there is no such location, since the functional roles are not conceived as roles for 
bodily motion, but as irreducibly normative roles. By way of consequence, the ontology of the 
mental as defined by normative roles remains in limbo, because it is unclear how these 
functional roles are realized. Of course, there is no question of any sort of normative 
functionalism when it comes to quantum gravity. But this example highlights that one cannot 
simply endorse functionalism with respect to the features that do not figure explicitly in the 
fundamental ontology and take for granted that the functional roles are realized by and thus 
located in what is admitted to the ontological basis. The functional definitions have to be 
adapted to the fundamental ontology: they have to be definitions in terms of causal roles for 
the behaviour of the entities in the ontological basis in order to be in the position to show how 
the functionally defined features enter into the ontology. 
To further stress this point, consider one of the earliest statements of atomism by 
Democritus: 
... substances infinite in number and indestructible, and moreover without action or affection, 
travel scattered about in the void. When they encounter each other, collide, or become entangled, 
collections of them appear as water or fire, plant or man. (fragment Diels-Kranz 68 A57, quoted 
from Graham 2010, p. 537). 
What makes atomism attractive comes out clearly in this quotation: on the one hand, it is a 
proposal for a theory about what there is in the universe that is both most parsimonious and 
most general. On the other hand, it offers a clear and simple explanation of the realm of the 
objects that are accessible to us in perception. Any such object is composed of a finite number 
of discrete, pointlike particles. All the differences between these objects – at a time as well as 
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in time – are accounted for in terms of the spatial configuration of these particles and its 
change. Consequently, there is a direct link proposed here from the fundamental ontology to 
the perceptible macroscopic objects in terms of composition and change of composition, for 
which spatial relations are crucial. That link is independent of any particular physical theory 
(particles may be replaced with field configurations, or events; the dynamics may be local, or 
non-local; it may be deterministic, or stochastic, etc.). It provides a framework within which 
all the notions that figure in the description of the natural world and that are not defined on 
the levels of atoms can then be introduced in terms of their causal or functional role for the 
change in the atomic composition. 
The conclusion hence is this one: one cannot take the functionalism with respect to the 
special sciences, including common sense and ordinary macroscopic objects, as model and 
abandon the functional definitions of these things in terms of causal roles for the motion of 
spatially or spatiotemporally related physical objects. This functionalism provides no clue as 
to how these things could be located in something else than in configurations of such objects. 
This is the reason for the reservations that one may have as to whether wave function monism 
has accomplished a functionalist account of ordinary macroscopic objects including the 
experimental evidence and thereby solved the measurement problem. To establish such a 
functionalism, new functional definitions of these things would be required in terms of their 
effects on the evolution of the universal wave function in configuration space. To put it 
differently, the functionalist programme with which we are familiar works in terms of 
functional roles for bodily motions, which are finally molecular or particle motions (or the 
ones of field configurations or events in ordinary spacetime). It thus takes the composition of 
these bodies by molecules and finally point particles (or field configurations, or events) for 
granted and thereby is committed to ordinary spacetime, viz. spatiotemporal relations. 
Coming back to functionalism about spacetime in quantum gravity, taking the debate about 
the ontology of and functionalism in quantum mechanics into consideration leads to two 
conclusions: 
1) The standard for ontology are not suggestions on the basis of an algorithm to calculate 
measurement outcome statistics. The standard is the solution to the measurement problem, 
that is, an answer to the question how the features that are peculiar to the quantum 
formalism (such as the superposition principle) relate to empirical reality. 
2) Existing versions of functionalism in quantum mechanics, including a functionalism that 
does not regard spacetime as fundamental, but the universal wave function in 
configuration space, provide no template as to how a functionalism with respect to 
spacetime in quantum gravity could be worked out. The reason is that we do not have 
functional definitions at our disposal that are not definitions with respect to the behaviour 
of spatiotemporal objects. 
These two aspects are related: it is not clear how a functionalism that echews functional or 
causal roles for the behaviour of spatiotemporal objects could accommodate measurement 
outcomes. 
3. The case of relativistic physics: quantum field theory and general relativity 
When it comes to quantum field theory, the situation is similar to the one in quantum 
mechanics. The formalism to calculate measurement outcome statistics works with a varying 
number of particles, and there is experimental evidence of particles popping up and 
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disappearing. Does it follow from this that particles are not fundamental? No, it does not, for 
the same three reasons as it does not follow, for instance, from the Heisenberg uncertainty 
relations that there are no particles moving on continuous trajectories. The measurement 
problem hits quantum field theory in the same way as quantum mechanics (see notably 
Barrett 2014). The types of solutions are the same as in quantum mechanics. In particular, 
there is a Bohmian solution available that is based on an ontology of particles. The first such 
worked out proposal was the one of an ontology with a varying number of particles with a 
probabilistic law of motion (see Bell 2004, ch. 19, and Dürr et al. 2005). More recently, also 
an ontology of a very large, but finite number of permanent particles (the so called Dirac sea) 
that move according to a deterministic law of motion (guiding equation) has been set out for 
quantum field theory. Also from this ontology follows the Fock space formalism to calculate 
measurement outcome statistics in terms of particle creation and annihilation operators via an 
appropriate probability measure (see Colin and Struyve 2007, Deckert et al. 2018). Thus, 
again, there is no question of endorsing far reaching ontological consequences, such as 
abandoning the idea of there being (permanent) particles in nature, on the basis of an operator 
formalism to calculate measurement outcome statistics. The question is which proposal for an 
ontology of quantum field theory offers the overall best explanation of the evidence and, in 
particular, the most convincing solution to the measurement problem. A serious debate about 
the answers to that question has only just begun. 
Turning to general relativity theory, there is no such debate about the ontology of this 
physics as there is about the ontology of quantum physics. Nonetheless, recent research has 
made clear that this physics has a dual nature: one can either set up this physics in the guise of 
a dynamics with a metric of a four-dimensional spacetime in which there is no privileged 
foliation of this spacetime and thus no objective simultaneity, but there then is an absolute 
scale that defines the spatiotemporal intervals between events. Or one can set up this physics 
in terms of configurations that are defined by their shape only. In this case, one requires well-
defined three-dimensional spatial configurations, but uses only scale-invariant quantities (see 
Gomes et al. 2011, Gomes and Koslowski 2013 as well as Gryb and Thébault 2016, in 
particular pp. 692-697). Developing the shape dynamics that goes back to the work of 
Barbour and collaborators since the 1970s (e.g. Barbour and Bertotti 1982, Barbour 2012) as 
a theory of gravitation is an in principle possibility, not a practical advice for carrying out 
concrete calculations. Nonetheless, the issue of two different versions of a theory of 
gravitation cannot be settled by observation: both yield the same particle trajectories given 
appropriate restrictions. One can neither observe absolute scales nor absolute simultaneity. 
Hence, again, far reaching ontological consequences cannot be built on the fact that working 
physicists use the formalism of a four-dimensional, curved spacetime with no privileged 
foliation. The issue again is a matter of philosophical debate about which ontology constitutes 
the overall best explanation. 
4. Conclusion 
Coming back to the alleged disappearance of spacetime in quantum gravity, we can make 
three points on the basis of the preceding considerations with respect to the ontology of 
quantum mechanics and quantum field theory as well as general relativity theory. (1) In the 
first place, the spacetime functionalism in quantum gravity faces the same problem as the 
functionalism in wave function monism: as things stand, there are no functional definitions 
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provided that locate spacetime or spatiotemporal relations in causal roles for the behaviour of 
non-spatiotemporal spin networks or causal sets. The most advanced paper in that respect, 
Lam and Wüthrich (2018) does not spell out such definitions. Again, the usual functional 
definitions provided in standard functionalism with respect to the special sciences, or with 
respect to dynamical parameters such as mass and charge, are not applicable in this case. 
They are construed in terms of causal roles for the behaviour in the sense of the 
spatiotemporal evolution of something. 
(2) Most importantly, the approaches to quantum gravity that allegedly entail that 
spacetime or spatiotemporal relations are not fundamental are approaches that, as things 
stand, do not yield any empirical predictions. Overcoming this lack is not just a matter of 
further pursuing these approaches as they are conceived up to now. The principled reason for 
the lack of empirical predictions is that, as things stand, these approaches do not take matter 
into consideration. However, all empirical predictions are about the behaviour – that is, the 
motion – of matter. Recall that, for instance, even in the case of the gravitational waves 
detected by LIGO (Laser Interferometer Gravitational-Wave Observatory) in 2016 that 
confirm general relativity theory, what is observed and what is the evidence for gravitational 
waves consists in the motion of material objects. 
Hence, the measurement problem that any quantum formalism faces due to the 
superpositions in the wave function does not even come into the view of these approaches, 
not to mention a solution to that problem. However, the measurement problem is the standard 
for ontology in any quantum theory, because it provides the link between the formalism and 
the physical reality. The obligation to solve this problem motivates pursuing a primitive of 
ontology of material objects for which at least spatiotemporal relations are fundamental, that 
provides an ontology for quantum theories in the areas of mechanics and the standard model 
of elementary particles as well as gravity and that gives an account of the individual processes 
in nature that lead to measurement outcomes. 
To illustrate this assessment in terms of one obvious example, consider the fact that in the 
Wheeler-deWitt equation figures a stationary wave function. That is to say, by contrast to the 
Schrödinger equation in quantum mechanics and the Dirac equation in quantum field theory, 
in the corresponding equation in loop quantum gravity, the wave function of the universe no 
longer develops in time. However, from this fact follows a problem of time – or the 
entitlement to the conclusion of the disappearance of time on the fundamental level – if and 
only if one presupposes wave function monism. In other words, this far reaching ontological 
conclusion follows only if one adds a controversial ontological premise. If one pursues a 
primitive ontology approach in order to solve the measurement problem, the wave function 
and the equation for it only have a dynamical role as being the central element in providing a 
dynamics for the evolution of the configuration of the primitive ontology. A stationary wave 
function can do so in the same manner as one that develops in time. Furthermore, if it turned 
out that the wave function of the universe were stationary, this would strengthen the claim 
made in the context of primitive ontology theories that it is nomological by contrast to being a 
physical object (see Dürr, Goldstein and Zanghì 2013, ch. 12, for that claim). 
(3) Lam and Wüthrich (2018, p. 41) write: “Most importantly, the QM context allows for 
spacetime-based ontologies that constitute alternatives to wave function realism in a way that 
is not straightforwardly available or legitimate in the context of QG”. This statement is simply 
not true. Spacetime-based ontologies, which add a primitive ontology of spatiotemporally 
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related material objects to the wave function, are legitimate in the context of quantum gravity 
in the same way as in the context of quantum field theory or the context of quantum 
mechanics, namely as reply to the question of how the formalism relates to physical reality 
and, in particular, as solution to the measurement problem. They are also available in the 
context of quantum gravity. For instance, a Bohmian primitive ontology for quantum gravity 
is pursued in Goldstein and Teufel (2001), Vassallo and Esfeld (2014) and Pinto-Neto and 
Struyve (2018). A primitive ontology of GRW flashes is pursued in Tilloy (2018) (see also 
Okon and Sudarsky 2014 for wave function collapse models in quantum gravity). 
Furthermore, even if one considers only spacetime, leaving aside matter, shape dynamics is 
available also in quantum gravity as an approach that bases itself on fundamental spatial 
relations (see notably Barbour, Koslowski and Mercati 2013 and Gryb and Thébault 2016). 
In conclusion, there is no reason to suppose that the status of the claim that there is no 
fundamental spacetime is in any way superior to the status of the claims about changing logic 
to make sense of quantum mechanics, that quantum objects do not have positions and 
trajectories, that there are no (permanent) particles in the ontology of quantum field theory, 
etc. One may make a sound case for such claims. But the case has to be made by arguing that, 
in contrast to rival approaches that fully match the algorithm to calculate measurement 
outcome statistics and that do not make any such claims, endorsing such far reaching 
ontological consequences leads to the overall best explanation and, notably, the best solution 
to the measurement problem. There is no question of it being possible to establish such 
ontological claims directly on the basis of certain formalisms, as if there were no alternative 
to them for anyone who takes the physics seriously. As regards quantum gravity, we are still 
quite far from being able to engage in a serious discussion about which approach provides the 
overall best explanation and, in particular, the best solution to the measurement problem. 
Consequently, as things stand, it is reasonable to recommend caution about proposing far 
reaching ontological consequences such as the disappearance of spacetime or fundamental 
spatiotemporal relations. 
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